Xerox changed CEOs on Monday. The press release used words like “strategic insight” and “operational discipline.” The stock price used a number: $1.30.
That’s a 73% decline over the past twelve months. A total market cap of $167 million for a company that reported $7.02 billion in fiscal 2025 revenue. For context, that means the market values Xerox at roughly 2.4% of its annual revenue. The average S&P 500 company trades above 2x revenue. Xerox trades at 0.02x.
The board appointed Louie Pastor, who joined the company in 2018 as general counsel and most recently served as president and COO. He’s 41. Steve Bandrowczak, who is 65, stepped down effective immediately. Xerox offered no further comment beyond the press release.
Read the departure the way you’d read any sudden CEO exit at a distressed company: something had to give.
What Bandrowczak Built — and What Broke
Give Bandrowczak credit for ambition. In three and a half years as CEO, he acquired Lexmark for $1.5 billion and ITsavvy for $400 million, added 6,100 employees (a 36% headcount increase), and tried to reposition Xerox as something more than a printer company. The Lexmark deal closed July 2025. The ITsavvy acquisition was supposed to give Xerox a direct path into managed IT services.
The strategy made sense on paper. Print volumes are declining. Hardware margins are compressing. Every legacy print vendor is searching for recurring revenue, and managed services looked like the escape route.
Here’s the problem: on a pro forma basis — accounting for Lexmark and ITsavvy as if they’d been part of Xerox for the full prior year — revenue actually fell 7.6% in fiscal 2025. The acquisitions added top-line size but didn’t produce growth. Meanwhile, Xerox posted a GAAP net loss of $1.03 billion. That’s an improvement from the prior year’s $1.32 billion loss, but “losing less money” isn’t a turnaround story. It’s a runway calculation.
The PE Lifeline
In February, Xerox raised $450 million from TPG Credit in exchange for equity interests tied to specific intellectual property assets. Xerox retains use of its own name and trademarks but effectively pledged a portion of its IP portfolio to get liquidity.
When a company with $7 billion in revenue needs to monetize its trademarks for cash to “augment liquidity,” the margin for error has evaporated.
That TPG deal also tells you something about the timeline. PE firms don’t write $450 million checks to companies run by CEOs they’re about to replace. The sequence matters: investment in February, CEO change in March. Either TPG was comfortable with the transition, or TPG helped engineer it. Neither reading is reassuring for anyone who thought the Bandrowczak strategy was working.
What This Means for Channel Partners
If you sell Xerox or Lexmark, you already know the environment is uncomfortable. Here’s what to watch.
Integration risk is real. The Lexmark deal is nine months old. Integrating two print companies with overlapping product lines, different channel programs, and different go-to-market models takes years under stable leadership. Doing it during a CEO transition, with a billion-dollar net loss and a PE firm watching the cash, adds friction at every level. Last year, Xerox’s channel chief said partners were “key to reinventing ourselves.” That language usually precedes program changes. Expect them.
The ITsavvy play matters more than Lexmark. Lexmark was about scale in a declining market. ITsavvy was about becoming a managed services company. If Pastor keeps that direction, Xerox might eventually compete with the same MSPs and VARs it sells through today. If he reverses it to cut costs and stabilize the balance sheet, the managed services ambition goes dormant. Either path changes your competitive math.
Watch the CFO slot. Xerox replaced its CFO in December with Chuck Butler. New CEO plus new CFO at a company burning cash means the financial strategy is being rebuilt from scratch. For partners, that means comp plans, program benefits, and deal structures are all in play. Nothing is locked.
The Bigger Pattern
Xerox isn’t the only legacy hardware company trying to buy its way into services. HP’s Imagine 2026 event pushed the same narrative: platforms over products, lifecycle management over box sales, partner-led services over transactional resale. The difference is HP can afford to be patient. Xerox can’t.
At $1.30 a share, the market has already priced in a specific outcome: either the turnaround produces results within the next 12 to 18 months, or the company gets restructured (again) under conditions that won’t be friendly to anyone holding channel agreements.
Pastor’s first job isn’t strategy. It’s survival. Partners should plan accordingly.